

## **DIRECTORS LECTURE**

**14 November 2001**

### **David Held**

Good morning/good afternoon, it is wonderful to see so many people here. It is a pleasure to introduce the second of the Director's Lectures on the Future of the Nation State, which is of course a very substantial question.

I've known Tony Giddens since 1974 when I first met him in Boston. The occasion was a lecture, something like this, and it was during lunchtime, but on that occasion what I remember about the lecture was two things. He was eating a submarine sandwich as big as any sandwich I have ever seen, while speaking coherently about future trajectories in social and political theory. I wasn't quite sure which impressed me the most but the double act was very impressive and we know that there were many Presidents of the United States that were not able to bring off such a two fold acts at the same time.

It is a great pleasure, as I say, to introduce the second of these lectures. Tony has been at the forefront of debate in social and political theory really for over three decades, that is a truly remarkable feat and it is a testimony to two things, three things really: his energy which is second to none, his intellect which has kept going throughout all those three decades and finally the fact that he is constantly in touch with contemporary debates in political and public issues.

Well, today is a very major topic and we welcome you and look forward to what you have to say, Tony.

### **Tony Giddens**

Thanks very much.?

I am very pleased that David is chairing this event and each of these lectures we are going to follow the same format, that is of a senior member of the LSE academic faculty chairing it, peppering me with (if you can say "peppering") with two questions afterwards and then time for two or three questions from the audience.

David Held is Professor of Government at the LSE, he is probably the global expert on globalisation. The globalisation debate is a thread running through all the five lectures I am giving, and I feel it has to be a thread running through all of your work, because it is the debate of the time, really. You have to turn to David's books if you want elucidation of it and his main book, called Global Transformations, it is down on the Reading List which is on the website for these lectures. Global Transformations is probably the most sophisticated discussion of globalisation available and it is complemented by a reader, also very sophisticated; David you can give me the money afterwards for my cut of that.

### **David Held**

we should stop this now and get on with...

### **Tony Giddens**

Again just to repeat it is very nice to see so many people. As David said, my theme today is the Future of the Nation State. To talk about the future of the nation state you must also talk about its past because you cannot understand what is likely to happen to a global institution like the nation state unless you have some sense of how it has evolved over the past 200 years or so.

LSE is, as I noted last time and was saying while talking with a few people just before the lecture, very cosmopolitan institution. So I could easily ask people here "where are you from?" I do not think you would normally answer by giving a regional response, I do not think you would normally answer by saying "I'm from Latin America", or "I am from Asia" or "I am from Africa", or "I'm from Europe", you would say that you are from a particular country and when you say you are from a particular country, you mean a particular nation or nation state and the fact that you would give this response shows that national identity, one's feeling of belonging to a national community is still a very powerful thing in our lives and this will be the substance of what I have to argue in this lecture, largely against those who today deny that this so.

The denial of the continuing importance of the nation state is very much part of the debate about globalisation, entering the global age, that I discussed in the previous lecture. Some of the figures that I briefly mentioned in that lecture have written devastating critiques of the role of the nation, a kind of indictment plus analytical conclusions about the role of the nation, that is very important to address. These are authors who speak essentially about the end of the nation state.

On my bookshelves I've got no less than three books, with titles along the lines of the End of the Nation State. This theme is very much part of the wider debate about what it means to live in a more global society. A good example is the celebrated Japanese author who I briefly did mention last time, Kenichiro Ohmae. He has written several books on this theme, he is one of the most famous authors really, who has announced this from something like 20 years back so it is not as if it is something he discovered recently. He invented the idea of the borderless economy and he is one of the authors who has actually written a book called The End of the Nation State.

What is the thesis here? Well, the thesis is that in the increasingly integrated global economy which we discussed last time, other actors replaced the nation as the prime actors, not just on the world stage, but also in our local and even our personal lives too. According to Ohmae the advance of markets, the advance of economic interdependence, the advance of economic regionalism, which we also discussed last time, these things subvert the traditional power of the nation state and we are likely to see really major realignments of the role of the nation state in coming years, at least according to him. Like some other writers, he argues that within like two or three decades you might see nation states largely replaced by city states, he has written in one particular context that we might have something like several hundred city states, which will have a loose attachment to what used to be the nation state of which they are a part, but which find their identity primarily from involvement in the global economy and their separate nature of that involvement which the forces we discussed last time tend to promote. So, if you think of some of the examples like, the instance of Hong Kong, or the instance of Barcelona I mentioned last time, or even big cities like New York and London, they find their economic political cultural identity more from their involvement as global cities within the world economy and the wider world society than they do from the nations of which they are a part. The borderless economy is therefore, for him, a reality and with it follows the large scale disappearance of the significance of the borders associated with nation states.

It is a challenging thesis and I do not think it is by now a particularly unconventional one. As everyone here will probably know, it relates quite closely to what people are now saying about government and political power. Many people are saying that the state and government have lost the role that they used to have, that many people feel disaffected with politics, that is why they are joining up for example with anti-globalisation movements, because democracy has sort of been eroded by the advent of decision making which no longer happens from within the orthodox public sphere as defined by the nation in traditional political theory. David himself, who has a much more sophisticated position on this and has written about these phenomena very interestingly, the

problem of sustaining the national public sphere in a world where so many issues and so many problems do not originate within the sphere of nation government.

So this thesis is a very prevalent one and I believe it is shared by some of the protesters on the streets because protesters are also saying "Well, look whole world is being invaded by corporate power, whole world is being invaded by markets, it takes away the framework of democratic legitimacy within which we should exist and that framework of democratic legitimacy has to be national." I would suggest to you that as it were the far right and the far left are united on this theme, far right movements around the world want to recapture the power of the nation state in the face of what they see to be the forces which are kind of hollowing it out or undermining some of its pre-established power. So this debate is a really important one and as the comments I made at the beginning suggest it is not just a debate about structures, it is a debate about identity; who we are, how we feel, where we belong, what kind of community we belong to, how we define our prime identities and so forth.

Now, to get a position on it, there are two things one has to do, one can be done fairly shortly, the other needs to be done in a bit more detail. First we have to make some conceptual distinctions to sort our way through the nature of this debate. Specifically, we have to distinguish between the nation state, the nation and nationalism. These three are often merged and often this is simply done in a shorthand way and I can have some sympathy for that, but conceptually it is crucial to distinguish them because they often have a different momentum, they do not necessarily relate directly to one another. The nation state is above all a political formation, the nation state is a form of political order which is marked by certain characteristics that I will elaborate in more detail, but is essentially a political system which rules over a given territory defined by its borders. The nation state traditionally has had control of an apparatus of law and over an apparatus of military power, it is therefore a political formation. The nation is the symbolic community associated — but not inevitably associated for reasons I will talk about later — with the nation state. The nation is what gives you your feeling of identity when you answer a question to me about who are you or where you are from, when you say "I'm Mexican", or "I am Indian", or "I'm Chinese", or "I'm British".do notThe nation is what the famous theorist of nationalism, Benedict Anderson, calls the imagined community. The imagined community is the symbolic community to which you belong, if you are a citizen of a nation state at least in principal, it gives you a feeling of identity and it establishes continuity and history. As Anderson shows, and this is important again for reasons to be discussed a bit later, it is hard to create a symbolic community for the nation, it takes quite a lot of historical time to create a shared community to which people feel they belong and it is constantly threatened. There are many divisive trends within most nation states, they can threaten the symbolic community which is the nation.

You must separate both of these two from nationalism. Nationalism is essentially as I would understand it anyway, a psychological phenomenon, nationalism is your feeling of affiliation to the nation. Nationalism is the kind of emotional fuel upon which the symbolic community of the nation runs. Nationalism is a feel of affection, involvement, emotional commitment to the nation.

The reason why you must distinguish these is that you can at least have one or two of them without the others. You can, for example, have a nation without a nation state and this is something again I will discuss at least briefly a little later on and feelings of nationalism can fuel the aspiration to become a nation state where a nation sees itself as a symbolic community but is not in fact a state formation. There are many examples of that around the world, from the kind of local examples of Scotland and Wales through to the Kurds and many other groups many of which feel themselves to be nations, or many people within them feel themselves to be nations but do not have a state.

Now, the historical background to the evolution of the nation state is absolutely central to grasping

what is happening to nations today and central to understanding what the nation state actually is and therefore its likely future will become. The best way to grasp this is to see that the history of the nation state is actually much more recent than many people, including many scholars, think. The nation state is a relatively recent historical formation, it dates only effectively from the latter part of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, it is largely a creation of Europe, or those societies which are colonised by the Europeans, like the United States or Australia and New Zealand. It was first established in this part of the world and then became generalised to others, so the nation state is not a state form, nor are its other elements, the nation and nationalism which have always existed. Anthony Smith who was a famous writer on Nationalism on the LSE academic faculty has shown quite convincingly that many nation states do have ethnic continuity, though ethnic identities quite often go back a long time in history, while nation states as I will describe them are relatively recent: they might have their roots in the historical past but they do not have a long term history. This is crucial because what one is saying here is that although many people think of modernity, of modern civilisation, essentially in terms of economic change and the industrial revolution, the emergence of industrial technology in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, the nation state is just as much a part of modernity as modern economic industrial production is, a fact appreciated only by relatively few social thinkers, but it's a central feature of what has happened to the world, specifically over the past two hundred years. Nation states therefore differ systematically from the forms of state which have dominated world society up to the late 18<sup>th</sup> century, some of which endured well into the 20<sup>th</sup> century. You can draw systematic contrast between traditional states and nation states. If you understand the nature of this contrast you get a long way to understanding what the nation state is as a structural political form. Let me run through five main characteristics.

First, traditional states were segmental in nature. By traditional states you mean states like traditional China which endured right up to the threshold of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, or traditional Rome going further back, or traditional civilisations in Europe during the feudal period and those kinds of pre modern state forms. Traditional state first of all is always, without exception, segmental. That now forgotten thinker, Karl Marx, described traditional states as being like a sack of potatoes and in this he was correct. This means that in traditional states you did not have centralised political power. The power of the political centre, even in the most advanced traditional states of which China for a long period was the most advanced, the political centre in traditional states did not have anything like the political power which we are accustomed to nation states wielding. This was because lack of communications and economic-social integration made it really difficult for the central political apparatus to gain much power over the every day life of the people who lived in those states; you could not actually call them citizens because they did not have the sort of active role within the state which citizens have in nation states. So, traditional states look very different in form from nation states. The rise of the nation state is marked by the consolidation of a centralised political apparatus of power. We have become so used to this that you do not realise how historically unique really it is and it is again something subject to constant strains and tensions.

Second, traditional states never, or only very rarely, had overall cultural and linguistic identity. Of course it's true that not all nations do, perhaps a minority of nations do, but cultural identity and the idea of the nation are closely bound up with one another. In traditional civilisations people who lived in local villages normally spoke a different language from the ruling class. The ruling class had very little linguistic or cultural contact with most of the population over whom they ruled. Some people have said that traditional states are essentially a kind of apparatus of extortion, the central political leadership did two main things, it taxed people and it forced them sometimes to fight in wars but it was not an integrated cultural or linguistic community. Nation states, by contrast, always have this as an ideal — or virtually all of them have this as an ideal, there are some exceptions like Switzerland for example — but the idea of the nation is the idea of a shared culture and commonly shared language, it is important because some nations that want to become states define themselves precisely by these characteristics. So the rise of the nation state in the 18<sup>th</sup>

century onwards always influenced by the educational system, always influenced by the creation of the imagined community that Benedict Anderson refers to, was created largely in conjunction with the state apparatus and having unitary educational system as theorists of the nation state like Ernest Gellner, who also used to teach at the LSE, have always accentuated. Traditional states were not like that.

Third, traditional states never had a monopoly of the means of violence, so that traditional states, like traditional China for example, there was always a push and pull between the political centre and local warlords for the control of the means of waging war. The local warlords, as you see in Afghanistan to some extent even today, still had extraordinary local power because there was no process whereby the traditional state could monopolise the control of military violence. The process of monopolising military violence therefore was again a really vital stage in the evolution of the nation state. It is difficult for all nations to take this monopoly for granted because it can itself be under threat, but it became a major feature, especially of western European nations, and you can mark it you can quite easily mark it with the rise of police forces. With the rise of a police force, it deals with internal security and the army is only called in in matters of internal security in relative emergency situations. That separation is normally a marker of the successful monopoly of the means of violence by the state. But, you recognise what an unusual thing this is in history: in traditional states you could not even travel safely for example. If you wanted to travel from say London to Edinburgh, but you could not just travel to Edinburgh and expect not to be bothered by brigands or bandits or robbers, because they lay in wait in many different parts of any long term traveller's movement from one destination to another. The state did not at that point have a monopoly of the means of violence. You could say this has all returned, maybe in a kind of high tech version with what the global terrorist networks are seeking to do today, they are making travel again unsafe, they are again saying "Well, are we really safe travelling to New York?" But for many years most people, especially in the west, have become used to safety and security of travel; this is a recent development, it is not something which existed for a long time in history.

Fourth, traditional states had frontiers as geographers call them, not borders. Again it is hard to underestimate the significance of this. When you have frontiers you do not have divisions on a map, you have graded areas where the authority of the political centre gradually shades off. Traditional China, traditional China had a wall around it and because of this quite a lot of it you might assume that wall was the boundary of the state. But it wasn't: there was constant fighting over areas stretching both sides of the Great Wall of China and the local warlords controlled the wall more often than the political centre did. The invention of borders is something therefore quite unique in history, a border is a line you can draw on the map and a border is a place where the authority of one state stops and another state begins. It was very difficult to set up borders it is a long historical process sometimes borders were set by western nations for others as happened in Africa, for example, with the consequences I'll go on shortly, at least briefly to discuss. But once you have borders then you can say you have an autonomous nation state because the political apparatus of the nation coincides with the borders.

Finally, traditional states —remember this is most of human history or 6,000 years of it I should say that lasted right up until the 20<sup>th</sup> century—traditional states did not exist within systems of states. Traditional states normally were dominate in one particular region, they were surrounded by tributary groups, often tribal groups who paid tribute to the imperial centre if it was an empire or to the local lord if it was a feudal system. Nation states from their origin have always existed within a state system. Being in a state system, that is having agreed upon borders, for example, demands the agreement of other states. So, from at least the 18<sup>th</sup> century, but to some extent in Europe before you have always had a state system that system emerged first of all in the west but subsequently became generalised over most of the rest of the world. The history of the progressive implementation of the

nation state, that is the wrenching of history away from traditional states which had dominated for long towards modern nation states, has produced dislocated consequences in different parts of the world and these also one needs to understand before I conclude with an assessment of whether the nation state is disappearing or not.

Essentially three different forms of nation-state-nationalism combinations today. First you have the classical nation state. The classical nation state is the one that conforms most closely to the criteria which I just mentioned. The classical nation state was established above all in Europe, the United States and the other areas through the world that I mentioned earlier, largely states or areas colonised by Europeans. Classical nation states then spread to other parts of the world, some parts of the world became fairly well established, for example in Latin America or Mexico there is now a classical form of the nation state with clear borders. That hasn't happened everywhere, so you have a second political formation which is usually called state nations.

State nations are states which were established before the symbolic community of the nation could actually be set up or which have never managed to achieve a symbolic community of the nation. State nations normally existed in areas where western countries have colonised other parts of the world, the borders established by western countries did not correspond to a generic historical reality and therefore these states have always faced the problem of creating an integrated symbolic community. The majority of state nations exist in Africa because Africa was the continent which was most clearly partitioned as a deliberate act by western powers in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. State nations tend to be more unstable than nation states simply because they do not have the association between effective territorial power and symbolic involvement of the citizenry, they tend therefore to overlap with different ethnic divisions, sometimes tribal divisions which do not necessarily correspond at all to the territorial boundaries which were drawn up by the colonial powers.

Finally, thirdly, you have a third category of nations without states. Nations without states are becoming particularly prominent on the world scene today, although to some extent they have existed for at least the last hundred or so years. A nation without a state, involves people who believe they belong to a given symbolic community that normally has the characteristics that Benedict Anderson outlines, in other words a shared language, a shared cultural history and some kind of symbolic, partly invented history, but you do not have a nation state. Nations without states therefore have nationalism because they are filled with national identity, they have the nation because they have some kind of symbolic community but they are not states, they aspire to be states and there are many examples like the ones I mentioned earlier, say the idea of the Kurdish nation which is distributed across several countries in the Middle East. There are sentiments that it should be an independent state, but of course it is not a state and awful conflicts surround this. It doesn't necessarily breed awful conflicts but there are many nations where at least some proportion of the population want that nation to be a state. In Europe for example you have all sorts of issues about this, what will happen with Scotland, what will happen with Catalonia, what will happen with the Basque country? Can Switzerland hold together? Why did Czechoslovakia divide? Will Belgium divide?

So what conclusions can one draw therefore about the future of the nation state? Well, the backdrop has to be complexity of the situation: the idea that there are simple nation states that exist and are being undermined by global pressures is plainly much too simplistic. You have a whole series of different processes going on in the world, some of them long term historical residue others are plainly the result of the impact of globalisation. We can draw against that complex backdrop, however, a few conclusions and let me list them quickly because I have got to try and finish within this novel format.

First, the idea that the nation state is coming to an end is plainly false. You could write a book calling it the Arrival of the Nation State, rather than the end of the nation state. Why? Well, because for virtually the first time in human history the nation state is becoming a universal form. It is not only traditional states that have coexisted with nation states for many years; for example, empires and you could say the Soviet empire was probably the last empire. The Soviet empire was a sort of commonwealth if you want to put it in a more or less pejorative fashion and many of the communities which were part of the Soviet commonwealth have now become independent nation states. It is plain that in some parts of the world nation states are more powerful than they were before and it is nowhere more obvious than in the case of parts of the world where they did not exist before, like eastern Europe where nation states have again become much more autonomous or around the southern fringe of whatever of what was the old Soviet Union. So, it can't be true to say the nation state is disappearing, the nation state is closer to being a universal form than it has ever been before and one should remember that state nations, mostly aspire to be nation states and so do nations without states. You can only have nationalist movements if you have a nation state as the outcome of those movements, so nationalist movements almost universally want to form nation states even if nation states do not exist in relation to those symbolic communities.

Second, however plainly the nature of the nation state is shifting, influenced by globalisation, it is happening differentially according to whether one is talking of classical nation states, state nations or nations without a state. Nations without a state are becoming, more pressing in the global age because they are more able to give voice to the local cultural identities, but it is fairly clear that a nation state is having to adapt to the threefold process of globalisation I mentioned last time. It is having to adapt to downward devolution which includes local nationalism and the pressures of nations without a state. It is having to adapt to loss of economic power within the overall economic arena which means that today we have to situate the nation state within what political scientists now call multi-layered governance. Nation states are changing their administrative shape because they are being integrated with forms of governance that exist above the level of the nation and that are also shifting patterns of regional autonomy below the level of the nation. I quoted to you last time the most celebrated dictum on this by Daniel Bell, "Nation states becoming too small to solve the big problems, too big to solve the small problems" that captures that adaptation. It doesn't mean that nation states universally are becoming less powerful but it does mean that they are reshaping the nature of sovereignty, they are reshaping the nature of administrative control of political power which they had previously.

Thirdly, this is affecting national identity. National identity is being rethought in almost all nations across the world. It is being rethought because of the collapse of the Cold War and because of the wider impact of globalising forces. Essentially what is happening at least in the more benign changes happening in the world, such as in the European Union is that national identity is becoming partly uncoupled from territory. The idea of a borderless economy might not be valid, not wholly valid but you can sustain national identity without the kind of fierce territoriality that used to exist in the past, such as the sharing agreements in the European Union for example. The European Union has loosened some of the territorial identities of its constituent nations, but it doesn't seem to me that that is necessarily produced a weakening of national identity though it does demand a rethinking of it.

Fourthly, many of the episodes of violence we see around the world are associated with the problems of establishing nation states. Therefore it is possible that the major conflicts facing us in the 21<sup>st</sup> century will no longer be so much nation state against nation state as they were in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, they maybe much more the problem of a weak states, how to deal with weak states and a kind of invasion of international networks into state nations or areas where state power is weak. This is true of Afghanistan for example, it is true of quite a few other areas around the world. The problem of weak states is no longer just a problem of building a nation state, that is part of the

issue, it is also a problem for integrating the arenas within which weaker states exist with the wider international community. Mary Kaldor, who is going to be chairing one of these sessions later on, speaks of new wars, associated with weak nations and with the intrusion of international patterns of violence into those areas. Those are the patterns that we are likely to have to cope with in future years; this might not be as awful as it looks because the massive nation state based wars that existed previously might become less common than they have in the past.

Well, thanks very much. I'll now hand over to David to interrogate me.

**David Held**

Well, not a bad 45 minutes. He has asked me to pepper him with questions, but since time is running short let me just ask two to begin with and then give you, the audience an opportunity to ask one or two questions yourself.

So let me just raise two points and they are very difficult points and it is these lectures about the emphasis of futures, there are two things which are particularly pressing and challenging, it would be interesting for you reflect on.

The first is about identities. You speak of us living increasingly in a multi-layered, multi-level political world and that is right, the nation state does look downwards towards sub-national regions, upwards towards regional entities like the EU and towards global government institutions. But, even in a place like the European Union where political elites have made the creation of a cosmopolitan European identity an explicit political project, even in the EU that project has relatively fragile support, identities remain stubbornly local. So is there an emerging contradiction and perhaps a dangerous contradiction between on the one side the dispersal of sovereignty and autonomy, the emergence of a multi-layered political world and on the other hand a focus of identity which remains tied to territory, to locality, to nation states. Most people do not think of themselves as Europeans they think of themselves as routed to particular places. This contradiction carries with it a number of political risks and I would be interested to have you reflect on them.

The second question I wanted to ask is related to that.

**Tony Giddens**

Can I answer that because I'll...

**David Held**

No, no you can't! The second question I want to ask, because I want the audience to speak to, I thought I would never get a chance to use the microphone so I have got to monopolise it for a minute or two. The second question...

**Tony Giddens**

I wouldn't have asked him if I had known he was going to be...

**David Held**

Be quiet! Be quiet! The second question I want to ask is this...

**Tony Giddens**

It's a bid for power and I feel it has to be resisted.

**David Held**

The second question – well, he is the Director, like you know, I have tenure, I have tenure. The second question I want to ask is this, is that some of the most pressing challenges which face our

generation and particularly your generation, that is to say younger students here, are now global issues, they are to do with global warming and environmental degradation, they are to do with financial stability and the terms of financial stability, they are to do with the rules of world trade and how one embeds welfare and environmental conditions into world trade. These are issues which escape the boundaries of nation states, these are issues which can no longer be resolved by states. So how, again in a world characterised by the first contradiction we find the cultural and political resources as it were, the authority to address these wider trans-national issues when at the same time identity still pulls politicians towards their local constituencies and towards the political systems, that is after all democracy, which requires politicians to account first and foremost to their constituents even if those constituents may have a very particular interest which cannot itself solve, resolve and legitimate solutions on a more widespread global scale.

I wanted to asked peppering questions, several more but I won't now. I want you to start with those two comments and then perhaps we can have a number of questions from the audience.

### **Tony Giddens**

I'll try and keep my answers brief because of the the time factor.

### **David Held**

So let's have four or five questions from the audience now.

### **Tony Giddens**

But I mean the first question is a really acute one and again everyone should reflect on it. The first question it is central to answering the second surely? Can we build forms of governance above the level of the nation which have legitimacy and which can allow us to deal with problems most of which do not come from within the sphere of the nation. Therefore, a great deal will hang on how far the European Union project is successful, . I mean I do not think the European Union can ever be like a nation state writ large, it will never get the same kind of feelings of loyalty and identity as nations do, but that is no reason why it shouldn't be an affective governmental apparatus and the expansion of the European Union eastwards, which is now certain to happen over the next four or five years is going to be a crucial test of all that, but I take it that the European Union therefore is a kind of experiment which the rest of the world has to watch with interest and, you know, you think of <UNKNOWN> in the southern Latin American cone, or you think of the free trade area in the northern part of Latin America and United States, these are all emerging attempts to respond to these issues, but we obviously have to consolidate global institutions too, and that is going to give us big problems as everyone can see. We need to manage the global economy but we do not really have legitimate institutions which allow us to do that too effectively and that is why so many people are in the streets protesting against the ones we do have. It would be fundamental not to abandon them, we need to solidify them and we need to make them more representative of the wider world community and not to think of scrapping them.

Shall we now open it up to the audience.

### **Question 1**

Do you think that the European Union is a force of globalisation?

### **David Held**

A force for globalisation or a reaction to it I suppose.

### **Tony Giddens**

It is now both because the European Union essentially was a Cold War formation, it began against the backdrop of the Cold War, it was an attempt to defend a separate space for Europe between

American market liberalism and Soviet Communism. Today it has to have a different role and that role has to be to react to, respond to and advance globalisation. So, it is both a response to it and an instrument of it, and as I tried to mention last time this is true of most forces of globalisation. They are not just forced externally, there is very much a kind of dialectic between active contribution to globalisation and a response to globalisation the EU is a perfect example of that.

## **Question 2**

If the crisis arises from weak states what can we do to make or help these states get stronger?

### **David Held**

It's a question, in a sense it runs counter to some of your arguments which is about maybe on the fundamental challenges in the political world now, let's say after the 11<sup>th</sup> September – I'm interpreting what you said – is the crisis a weak state and the challenge, political challenge is not so much strengthening global governments although that might be one of them, but also nation building and state building where they do not exist.

### **Tony Giddens**

Yes, it definitely is because, and Afghanistan is a perfect example of that, can after what has happened can a effective, decent society be built there, the international community is going to have to play a role in that so nation building is still very important but there is a distinction I would remind you between nation and nation states. Today you often want to build a nation, that you want to build a cosmopolitan nation with a mix of different cultures within it which is able to relate to other nations, therefore myself I am not in favour of either religious nations which define themselves purely through religion or too strong ethnic definition as a symbolic community, you have got to have a more cosmopolitan outlook on that. But you do not want to build just a traditional nation state, that is you do not want to go back to a world where armed nations simply confront one another, so you take Afghanistan or Kosovo or wherever the international community has to manage that and has to probably have a sustained presence in some of these areas, not just a transitory one.

### **David Held**

Can I just follow that up by one question. The process of secularisation, the separation of church and state, of religion and politics was one of the key conditions for the development of the modern state and the modern nation state, that condition is also the bases of religious tolerance, the diversity of the pursuit of different kinds of personal and public goods, it is the basis of the rule of law. Today in the context of the 11<sup>th</sup> September and so on we see that this is not a universal achievement, it is a contested achievement and there are many cultures and countries that resist secularisation on the one side and the separation of church and state or religion and politics on the other, the project as it were of modernity, the rule of law, human rights and democracy, does it to you seem to depend on its separation and what happens, what challenges are posed when this separation not only doesn't exist but there are people from cultures who refuse to accept the distinction at all?

### **Tony Giddens**

Well, before I seek to answer that which I will do very briefly can I just say in the next lecture, next week I'll be talking about global inequality, one of the biggest issues facing us, are inequalities increasing? If so why are they increasing? What can we do about them? These things relate to these issues just mentioned.

The question David asked is also a really fundamental issue for our age and I hope everyone will reflect on it independently of whatever I might say about it. It is a bit more complicated than David tended to imply, because different religious traditions have actually played a part in generating a

state which is able to accommodate liberal values. So, Christianity for example, it wasn't just the retreat of the church from the state, some values of Christianity also were involved in the development of liberal rights. If you take the Islamic states, the same thing is possible in Islamic states because Islam began as a very liberal religion, the same kind of doctrinal possibilities are there as existed in western countries. So it is possible to envisage a much more generalised process of the spread of liberal democracy which doesn't prevent the existence of cultural diversity and also religious diversity and that is certainly what we have got to aim for.

So thanks again for coming and I hope to see you next week. Thanks, David.