

## **DIRECTORS LECTURE**

**7 November 2001**

### **Fred Halliday**

Ladies and Gentleman can I welcome you all to this, the first of the Director's lectures. I am Fred Halliday from the Department of International Relations and it is a great honour that the Director has chosen to give his first lecture on an international subject.

As somebody who has been at the School for nearly twenty years I want to say what an enormous pleasure and stimulation it is to work here with Tony Giddens. We are divided up into different departments, seventeen departments, often very narrowly focused and one of the things Tony has done is to promote meetings of this kind and debates throughout the school of a truly interdisciplinary character, to create a common culture of the social sciences, and one of the things he has particularly worked on for many years, is the relationship of structure to agency of those things that in a way you cannot change about society and those things you can. He doesn't like me saying this but, some of my best friends are structures I hasten to add, the seasons, the academic year, the norms of liberal society, but agency matters as well, and he is an embodiment, despite his theoretical dispositions, of the importance of agency and in three respects.

First of all, he believes in education. Education matters and what you do with your education and what we do with our teaching matters to the kind of world we are creating and the kind of challenges we face and that is why we are here.

Secondly leadership matters. If you are in an institution which hasn't got good leadership you know it, and if you are in one which has got leadership you know it and I can say that this is an institution which has leadership.

The third is, I once took him to Kuwait and he handed out his CV in which among other things it said that he was supporter of Tottenham Hotspur and the first question from the audience was about the World Trade Organisation, but the second was about Spurs and Arsenal and the rest of the time in Kuwait that's what they wanted to know about and there couldn't be a better example of the relationship between structure with its rules and agency than football players on the field of the tension of these two things.

So without further ado, for the first of these lectures, and the second one will be next week, I give you our Director, Tony Giddens

### **Tony Giddens**

Thanks very much, Fred and I have to say in a slightly mutual admiration society that Fred is one of the major intellectual influences in the LSE, deservedly so. He is one of our greatest experts on international relations, he is going to interrogate me a bit towards the end and we will have a few minutes for at least one or two questions from the audience. So, I wait with some trepidation about what he is going to say, but he is much more important to the LSE than I am, honestly. Well anyway we are quite a good double act I hope.

Can I first of all welcome everyone here and especially welcome new students to the LSE. I was talking to one or two people before hand who have just come in this academic year, I hope you find the LSE as intellectually stimulating as I do. I hope that you will participate in the diversity of visiting the public lectures which the LSE offers, it is the best intellectual environment around, certainly in the social sciences.

I will be giving five lectures in this course, three this term and two next term. Slightly contrary to what Fred said they are all about the future of world institutions, they are all about the future of some of the major institutions that influence our lives. Today I am going to talk about the general backdrop to what is transforming world society. In the next lecture I am going to talk about the future of the nation, the nation state within the global arena. In the third one I am going to talk about global inequality, what we know about it, what causes it and what kinds of remedies we can set up to counter it and then I will be giving two further lectures on the future of the family, global changes in the family, it is just as important as the big institutions and the future of democracy, final lecture in the course some way through the second term. So I will be doing three in successive Wednesdays at this time, this term and I hope those of you who have come this time will also come back to the other lectures too. There is a reading list for these lectures if you are interested, and that is posted on the LSE website, or certainly should be posted on there by now, if it isn't on there perhaps someone would let me know. It is a fairly extensive reading list if anyone wants to consult the sorts of things that could fill in the backdrop of what I am talking about.

Well, what I am talking about in this first discussion today is essentially the state of world order, how we have got to where we are today, and what the likely prospects for the future of global society are. It is pretty impossible when broaching this topic not to start with the events of September 11<sup>th</sup> since they have introduced a major new factor into the structure of not only particular societies, but the world system as a whole. Now, everyone will have read newspaper accounts saying that after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, after the events of September 11, well the world will never be the same again.

Well, will the world never be the same again? There are two somewhat contrasting answers that one can give to this question.

The world will not be the same again for anyone living in the United States, because the sort of security, the kind of isolation, the massive power of the United States gave it from world events, that kind of security, that kind of separation has probably gone forever, certainly gone for the rest of this century. The kind of psychological feeling, almost of invulnerability, which many people in the US have had, has gone and will not return, certainly not return in the foreseeable future. Something new has happened here, and that something new however, is plainly not just a matter of what happens in the United States, this is a global event if ever there was a global event and indeed designed by its perpetrators as a global event, something I will come back to a bit later. We do not know as yet what its consequences will be because we are only at the beginning game of all this, not at the end game of this so far as the rest of the countries in the world and indeed the United States itself are concerned. We do not know if it marks a major shift in patterns of violent confrontation, it could be that what happened signals something for the century in which all of you will live out most of your lives, it might signal confrontations no longer primarily between nations directly, but between non-nation state actors working in networks across the world, promoting various forms of violence to pursue various kinds of causes. It might mark a major transition, we do not as yet know. In the United States what it is likely to signal is something more contained, it is likely to mean that those of you who are from the US or anyone who lives in the US are likely to have to experience the kind of fairly continuous low grade terrorist activity that we have experienced in the UK, and indeed many other countries have experienced over the past several decades. Not a repeat of the kind of massive event that happened but probably many more minor instances of attack will happen, as has happened here at the hands of various military organisations in the UK over a considerable period.

So there are important senses in which the world probably will never be the same again and by the world there you mean the world, you do not just mean the United States, there might be a major shift in the kind of patterns of violence which we will see over the next few decades.

But the second answer is, as it were, the opposite answer and in a way that is a more powerful answer. That is there are in many respects in which the world will be the same as before and there are again two major factors in this. One is that simply after an event of such magnitude at some point normalcy resumes, at some point a kind of psychological feelings of security that people must have in relation to a risky world return. I compare that normalcy to what happens – if you will forgive a somewhat trite analogy – what happens when you drive a car and see a major traffic accident. Some people here must drive cars, well if you pass by an accident where you see people dead by the side of the road, what do you do? You drive more slowly for quite a while. The reason for that is you see all the risks that you are facing that normally, psychologically you block off and have to block off as a driver. Well, we have suddenly seen the diversity of risks which any society can be subject to and there are a whole diversity of them, of vulnerabilities, new forms of vulnerability, but psychologically you cannot live in a world where you simply address all the risks we face all time, you tend to close them off. So, what happens when you are a driver is after an hour or so, your speed starts to resume and you are probably back at the speed you started before. Well, some kind of return to normalcy will happen in the United States and will happen in other countries in the world affected by this, but of course we do not know when because we do not know the longer term outcome.

However, the second factor of this is much more important and this is what I call the September 10 factor, and I would say most of this lecture and most of my discussions in subsequent lectures are about September 10, not September 11, meaning by September 10 the world as it was before these events occurred and the world as it was before these events occurred already had most of the influences, most of the trends, most of the divisions which underlay the attack on September 11<sup>th</sup>. To understand what went on on September 11 we must have a structural analysis of what is going on in the world society and this is what I want to spend the bulk of this lecture talking about. That structure analysis must begin with the impact of living in a more global world, it must begin with the impact of the debate about globalisation because that debate has suddenly become even more urgent for us. There is no doubt that we live in a more interdependent world than anyone has done in previous generations and there is no doubt that this attack in some sense was a version of that interdependence because a large scale network stretching across different countries was involved in it.

So I want to spend the bulk of this lecture discussing where we stand with the globalisation debate and then at the end come back briefly to the issues I just raised at the beginning.

The debate about globalisation has gone through two phases and there have been two phases in a debate about what globalisation is and what it means to live in a more globally interdependent world. The simplest definition of globalisation is interdependence, living in a more global world means living in a more interdependent world where events happening at one side of the world in a direct way impact on what is happening at any particular place in the world that one happens to be.

Now the first phase of what David Held as another professor at the LSE has called the great globalisation debate, goes back about 20 years or so, was essentially an academic one. It was a discussion about whether globalisation exists at all. It was therefore a discussion in a more profound sense of how far our world has shifted or not over the past 20 or 30 years. Many people doubted that our world today is really very different from the world of 40, 50 or perhaps even 100 years ago. These people came to be known as the globalisation sceptics, the globalisation sceptics argued that in spite of all the talk of globalisation, in spite of all the discussion of the term globalisation, not really very much has changed in the world. Globalisation sceptics argued that especially if you look back 100 years, to the late 19<sup>th</sup> century you find then there was already a very open economic system, there was already then a lot of trade in currencies, there was a lot of physical trade in

commodities, countries had pretty open borders in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, there were mass migrations across the world, just as there are mass migrations today. So the globalisation sceptics said "what's new?" It might be claiming that our world has changed very radically, that we are in a new global age but this claim is false, they argued, because really not a great deal has changed. At most what's changed is a kind of reversion to the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. So that was the first phase of the great globalisation debate and that has been resolved, that phase of the debate has been resolved precisely by the work of David Held, Fred Halliday and many other authors, quite a few of whom are actually located at the LSE, and these authors have shown quite definitively that the globalisation sceptics were mainly wrong. That is to say over the past 30 or so years the main institutions of global society have shifted dramatically, that although the current phase of globalisation, our global age shares some parallels, has something in common with the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, the differences are more pronounced than the similarities. You could, if you like, call the late 19<sup>th</sup> century the first global age and some people have taken to doing that, that global age was closed down by the advent of the two World Wars. You could and I do not have any objection to this say we are living in the second global age.

The second global age is essentially about 30 or 40 years old even though it builds on longer term trends of course. The second global age however, there is no doubt about it any more, is more intensive, it is more comprehensive, it affects everybody in the world, not just parts of the world, it is much more dynamic, it is much more fast moving and to some extent different institutions are involved from the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. So, the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, the early 21<sup>st</sup> century is definitively not just a replay of what happened before even though it has certain affinities with it. It is of course the second phase of the great globalisation debate that has brought people out into the streets and has created this extraordinary anti-globalisation movement, which made its presence felt first of all at the meetings of the World Trade Organisation in Seattle, but then has expanded in strength through all the different cities at which the WTO, ILF and other world organisations have met, the most recent being Genoa in Italy where as I am sure you will remember there was considerable violence involving the police and demonstrators and this was true in Goteburg and has been true quite often in these events.

So the second phase of the great globalisation debate is no longer just academic, it is immediately political, it involves itself a world-wide movement and it is something we all have to make sense of as social science students. It is incumbent on you to take a position on these things, to work out what is going on, to see whether what the protesters seem to want are things that we should all want or not. The reason why the second phase of the great globalisation debate is terribly important is it does intersect quite a lot with September 11, it is where September 10 and September 11 come closely together because it is a debate about the future of the world, it is a debate about what trajectory of development the world will follow and what influence we can and should try to have over that trajectory of development. But I would say when you look at the activities of the protesters and you look at the people they are protesting against, the big world organisations like the IMF, you have to say that for them, in my view any way, as for many other people who write about it, globalisation is talked about a lot today but it is poorly understood. It is talked about but I am not sure that all of the people who do talk about it have really grasped how basic, how fundamental the changes associated with it are. There is one prime reason for this, the prime reason is that most of the people who so to speak are for globalisation, let's say like the IMF or World Bank, but also the people who are "against" it, the anti-globalisation movement, both sides tend to define globalisation essentially as an economic phenomenon, as the expansion of the global market place and the increasing role which financial institutions, the world financial system plays in our lives. If you keep your eyes open, the famous financier, George Soros, who is, as you probably know, a graduate of the LSE and a supporter of the LSE has just produced a Soros Report on globalisation – well worth having a look at, it will come out formally in a couple of months time and we might be launching it here at the LSE. But Soros makes that mistake, that is Soros defines globalisation

essentially in terms of the global market place as essentially an economic phenomenon. Now, this is obviously not completely a mistake, obviously not because if you look at the impact of world financial markets for instance and you track back 30 years, which is basically the period I'm calling the global age, you can certainly show that the global financial systems become massively more influential over that period. There are now 2 trillion dollars turned over everyday on world currency markets, it's an extraordinary figure and it was only a fraction of that figure, 30 or so years ago.

So, certainly it has been an enormous economic acceleration in terms of expansion of global trading connections and the impact of global financial systems. It is still pretty regionalised, that is most trade is not truly globalised as you could put it, most trade is still regional. This is not true of currency markets but most trade in commodities is still regional so that the European Union, for example, mostly trades with itself; a great deal of the trade in the United States is not external trade, only about 10% of the American economy is external trade, so you are talking about regional trade and regional trading blocks, but these things do mark a pretty massive acceleration of global economic interdependence. However, it is crucial to say that globalisation is also political, globalisation is also cultural and it is, to my mind anyway, even more vital to say that globalisation is bound up with communications. The most important transformative force in our lives over the last 30 or so years is not economic markets, it's not economic interdependence, it is the impact of communications, especially, it is normally called the communications revolution. The communications revolution essentially dates from the late 1960s and that is the time at which the first effective satellite system was sent up above the earth making possible instantaneous communication from one side of the world to the other. Once that happened then so many other things change in the wider world and what happened along with that is a kind of marriage of communications technology and computerisation, the very kind of technological marriage which helped to make financial markets themselves 24 hour trading markets as they have since become. It is absolutely vital to stress the impact of communication and the fact that instantaneous communication is the main medium of our increasing interdependence because it intertwines with almost everything else. Go back to the events of September 11, those events involved a murder of non-combatants, people who are killed even though there is no claim whatsoever that they are involved in any kind of war situation, therefore it was a brutal act by any reckoning, but it was not just an act of murder. What happened on September 11 was clearly an act of global communication. It was experienced as an act of global communication, the people who perpetrated it designed it as an act of global communication an enormous proportion of the world watched the second plane crash into the second tower, there was about a 20 minute interval between them. It was a global media event, which symbolised something about the kind of commutative interdependence in the world in which we now live and if you follow what has been going on since then, Osama Bin Laden, how did he communicate to the wider world? Well through the use of videos, a video which described his message and which instantly became news around the world. Osama Bin Laden has perhaps most famous, or second or third most famous image in the world today and that is because of this instantaneous nature of our communication systems.

So that is what lies behind so many other changes and it lies behind the changes that transformed the Soviet Union. Its command structure, its economy could not cope with the kind of fluid world which modern mass communications tends to produce. That then impacts on the economy because economic change for us is very much influenced by the kind of immediacy of the ways in which things are done today. You cannot have a static, rigid economy in a world which in itself has become much more fluid, dynamic and fast moving.

The impact of communications is extraordinary and if you want to single out any single driving forces, it is the single most important one, but it is just as essential to emphasise that globalisation is not a single not phenomenon. You have a single term and therefore people imagine you can be for or against globalisation but globalisation refers to a cluster of changes. There are the two I

mentioned, economic transformation, transformation of communication systems, the third one is the ending of the Cold War. The ending of the Cold War was partly brought about by these other changes but also plainly contributed to them. The ending of the Cold War has produced extraordinary changes again in the structure of world society and if you look what is happening in Afghanistan, the consequences of all that, it is deeply buried in the history of the Cold War where the Soviets and the US fought out the Cold War in Afghanistan and other parts of the world. So we are still very much experiencing what it means to live in a world which is no longer a bi-polar world. It is because globalisation is such a complex thing, it is like a shorthand term for a complex of changes, that you have to be very careful saying you are either against it or for it. It is much more important to specify which aspects of these changes you are for or against, you can be against, for example, certain versions of free trade, but that is not at all the same as being for or against globalisation, in my view. It is also very important to recognise that because it is a complicated set of changes there is not a single set of consequences. Globalisation undoubtedly alters the powers of the nation, which I will be talking about in the next lecture, next week, but at the same time globalisation is responsible for the increasing importance of regionalism, the increasing importance of local nationalism, the increasing importance of decentralisation and devolution of power in our lives. Look what is happening in the UK, you have devolution of power to Scotland, devolution of power to Wales and further devolution will almost certainly follow. Well that devolution has been around a long time because there have been Scottish Nationalists around a long time, for example, but the fact that it has happened now is structurally related to the impact of what globalisation does. Globalisation, because it pulls some powers away from the nation it also pushes down, it forces decentralisation of power away from national government. The Sociologist Daniel Bell had perhaps the most celebrated quote about this that anyone has made, when he said "the nation state has become too small to solve the big problems and too big to solve the small problems". That is quite a good way of expressing this kind of push and pull which globalisation brings about.

Do not make the mistake of supposing that globalisation is purely an external force. So many people talk about globalisation in this way, so many people talk about the impact of globalisation on us as though it is simply external force somewhere in the world impacting on us if we are in a poor country or a rich country it doesn't matter it some kind of external thing. It is not like that. Globalisation is something produced by people in their everyday lives. It is produced asymmetrically because it does not of course create any egalitarian world but every time anyone here gets into the LSE website or turns on a computer, or uses the Internet you are not just responding to globalisation you are an agent of globalising processes because you are participating in these very processes that are helping to reshape the world. This is not just a phenomenon of the rich nations no matter how much the rich nations tend to lead the way and tend to dominate, every time a poor person in Zambia switches on the radio and listens to the World Service or listens to any kind of radio broadcasting, they are participating in wider globalising processes not just experiencing them. So globalisation is, as it were, a dialectical phenomenon, this goes back to the issue of agency that Fred mentioned in the beginning. We are agents of this process at the same time as we are affected by it and our lives are thoroughly transformed by it.

So in some I would define globalisation as a shift in the basic institutions of world society, that is therefore the theme of the rest of the lectures in this course, ranging all the way through from the family right the way through the nature of economic life, the nature of political sovereignty, of cultural life and the wider global society with the world institutions that I referred to earlier. A tremendous package of change, really difficult for any of us to adjust to whether it is emotionally, personally or on the level of academic analysis, but as academic analysts we must lead the way in trying to show what this world is like and what implications it has for us.

Now if you go back to the protest movements, what should we make of the anti-globalisation movement, its objectives and its likely impact on us? Well the first thing one has to say about this is

that the anti-globalisation movement for the reasons I mentioned just now does not stand outside globalisation. You might think that because you are against globalisation you are somehow outside those processes, but this manifestly not the case. It is much more accurate to see the anti-globalisation movement as part and parcel of globalising processes because as we know the people who assembled on the streets made use of new communications technologies, they used the internet, they used mobile phones and other communicative devices which define a large amount of what globalisation is about and of course they carried their message globally. The protesters on the streets were not just protesting locally, they were protesting globally and of course they knew and used the fact that the image of their protest was immediately carried around the world, so what happened was again like what happened in New York and Washington, a global event with global consequences. You are talking here, if you like, about two sides of globalisation, not people who are outside and people who inside. The two sides of globalisation are globalisation from above, essentially lead by the political policies of nations, say for example deregulation policies, by the activities of corporations, and other agents connected with them. Globalisation from below is specially influenced by the activities of non-governmental associations or NGOs and other civil society groups. Globalisation from below is again just as important to understand what globalisation is because you have a tremendous acceleration in the number of NGOs working in the world and their global purchase.

People say the big corporations have a global purchase, well so do the big NGOs, Oxfam, Greenpeace, so forth, these are truly global organisations. There are now, at the latest estimate 30,000 NGOs working in the world, there were only a few hundred, again 30 or so years ago, so you have two aspects or two institutional versions if you like of global interdependence, interacting around the protest movement.

We know that the people on the streets are very diverse, so there is not a single set of objectives which the anti-globalisation movement holds. There are quite a lot of groups with wildly different objectives, for example some far left groups involved in the anti-globalisation movement in some sort of way, one to overthrow capitalism as an economic system, even though no one knows any alternative at the moment to that system. But the majority of protesters I would say are peaceful, the majority of protesters actually come from the NGO sector. NGOs are very prominently represented in all the anti-globalisation marches, protest movements, do not intend violence and carry a serious message to us. What are they protesting about?

Well, there are three things, mainly, among the more sober side, as it were, of the anti-globalisation movement and all of them must concern all of us, whether we sympathise with the activities of the anti-globalisation movement or not.

The first claim they are making is that globalisation is essentially a western phenomenon, that it is dominated by the interests of the West and especially by the interest of the United States, that the rest of the world does not really get a look in, so that globalisation is essentially a project for one fifth of the world from which four fifths of the world are excluded. In my view that is not at all a correct presumption but it is something that must be addressed because there are major imbalances of power in the emerging global society as there were in the old Cold War period and those imbalances of power cannot really be tolerated, should not be tolerated if we try and build a more just and equal society on a global level. But we will have to come back to that in subsequent discussions.

Second, they are saying that corporations have too much influence, that because of the impact of market led philosophies and economic deregulation, the big business corporations who are unelected have too much power not only in developing parts of the world but also in our own lives too, the protesters are saying. Who elects the big corporations? Nobody. Yet the big corporations

seem to take many decisions which should belong in the public sphere, the sphere of democratic politics where all of us can give voice to our interests and discuss policy questions.

This argument also must be listened to, a good society is not a society which is dominated by the interests of the market place. A good society is not a society where corporate power becomes too big and where corporations can illegitimately affect democratic decision making. A society where markets invade too much of our lives it is unstable, it is erratic, it too unequal, a society where markets invade too much of our lives becomes too commercialised, the values which we should stand for in areas of our life, for example in health, education, or in a civic goods of city neighbourhoods, we mustn't allow those to become too commercialised because commercialisation, not inevitably, but can be the enemy of other values which I believe as civic minded citizens we should support. We mustn't assume that consumer power is the same as citizenship, we mustn't assume that the right to roam the isles of a supermarket is the same as citizenship rights within a democratic policy, within a democratic society. There is a retrieval of public space which needs to be pursued and that is again an issue which I'll come back to subsequently.

Finally, thirdly, the protesters are saying there is too much inequality in the world, that globalisation is a project not only of advanced sectors of the world but of the rich countries, the rich countries are pursuing their interests at the expense of the poor countries. The developing world is largely excluded and the protesters are arguing globalisation is producing a world which is riven within inequalities between rich and poor and that is why we should seek to reverse it, that is why we should seek to put the clock back. That is also an issue I'll be talking about directly in the third lecture of this series, these are all serious questions, I do not agree myself with some of the views of some of the protesters but these are all questions which we have to analyse and I will try to do so in subsequent discussions.

So I will now turn to Fred, who is going to interrogate me briefly and then if you can manage to stay at least until just before 2pm have one or two questions from the floor.

### **Fred Halliday**

One of the first things, do not interrogate your boss but I will give it a try.

Tony, I very much liked the point you made that we should think of 10<sup>th</sup> September as well as 11<sup>th</sup> September in terms of the ongoing problems, global inequality, there is a very good piece in today's Financial Times by Martin Woolf, making this point that the developed world, he said, is like people a stretch limo, driving with some security through a poor area, but actually that stretch limo is not protected from what they see through the window and the window has been broken on the 11<sup>th</sup> September, but that situation was there anyway. It also pertains to a question which should be asked more, is when did this war start? Did it start on the 7<sup>th</sup> October with the bombing of Afghanistan, did it start on the 11<sup>th</sup> September, or did it, as Bin Laden himself say, start many years ago – 80 years ago in his argument? In other words the conflict itself did not begin on the 11<sup>th</sup> September on either side and you can think back to military operations in the 1990s.

I wanted to ask you about two things. Speaking, wearing my international relations hat, without security there can be no globalisation and that the 10<sup>th</sup> September illusion is that security of the high seas, security of citizens, security of property, peace in the world, was largely taken care of and we could get on with the rest of the globalisation agenda which was a liberal internationalist agenda, trade, migration, higher education and so forth. Do not you think that in a way we have to look more carefully at the security underpinnings of globalisation, of all the other things we are talking about starting with something which we are all concerned about which is travel, which has suddenly become more insecure? I was in my local Sainsbury's the other day, there were some Russians there trying to buy English cheese, Cheddar "What this Cheddar 3, what this cheddar 5?" Anyway I got

talking to them, they were lawyers and I said "What do you think of British lawyers?" And they said "Very mediocre people." I said "Why?" He said "They have not read Hobbes." They have not read Thomas Hobbes. In other words they have forgotten issues of international security and I would like to know whether you think your own vision of globalisation and the problems can take on board the security issues and equally the question of who is going to do the security, because it ain't going to be global civil society, it ain't going to be the MNCs, it ain't going to be the LSE, it has got to be, unless I have got it wrong, it has got to be states and the bigger, tougher states at that and that is an old fashion problem.

### **Tony Giddens**

I will respond to that first of all and then come to your second one.

There is a serious element to that and I hope the LSE actually can contribute because for security you need a cosmopolitan world and you need people who are able to express cosmopolitan values, you need people who are able to lead the world onwards and this is what the LSE helps do and I think in the very existence of the LSE is you see so many people from so many different countries sitting here, it is a kind of expression of that cosmopolitanism.

Beyond that providing security is a difficult business but it seems to me and I think you agree at least to some degree that the structure of international relations has changed of the period that we are talking about. So, although there are still areas of the world where traditional wars between nations are not implausible and those include unfortunately between India and Pakistan or between Taiwan and mainland China, the Far East where you have real tensions and you have nuclear powers involved there, but for the most part the structure of violence does seem to be changing and it seems to be changing in these connected ways towards the existence or the problem of preventing bitter local intense often ethnic or religiously based conflicts of the kind we saw in ex-Yugoslavia or in other different parts of the world, extremely hard to manage. Once they start very hard to manage implications because they affect our security as you were hinting there, they are local but they are much more international than traditional wars perversely. Mary Kaldor at the LSE and Fred himself have written very instructively about these issues. That is conjoined with new networks of violence, it is plain the globalisation can produce new networks of violence. I just got back from the US two days ago and I was reading this book by Robert J. Lipton on the Japanese religious sect which released the gas in Japanese subway, where he has a kind of analysis of very similar structures to different fundamentalist movements around the world. They involve quite similar features, the existence of a guru, the existence of a clear division between black and white or good and bad, a recruitment of usually very quite young men, often marginalised men to the movement.

These are things which we do need to think of new ways of creating security against these and they won't be the old ways. But my belief is that we are an interdependent world, you cannot actually reverse some aspects of globalisation, you could reverse liberalisation of trade, but that would be a mistake, what you need to do is equalise the playing field for trade not reverse it, but I do not think we can reverse our new interdependence therefore I feel we must find ways of dealing with these security issues and they will probably mean new strategies from the past.

### **Fred Halliday**

Your distinguished predecessor, Sir Alfred McKinder believed that the role of the LSE was to promote a world empire...

### **Tony Giddens**

Who was he then?

### **Fred Halliday**

He was the second Director of the LSE.

**Tony Giddens**

Just kidding you, I mean the audience do not know.

**Fred Halliday**

And a truly terrible joke but you will all remember it, his name was McKinder and he thought that the LSE should train people for the empire and it should be, wait for it, the McKindergaren of the British Empire. But myself...

**Tony Giddens**

That's like Rhodes Scholarships.

**Fred Halliday**

My second and last question is this. You talked about global civil society. I sense and I sometimes feel it reading what you write, and Mary Kaldor and David Held write that you have too angelic a view, too trusting view of civil society, you do not ask enough the question "what are the responsibilities of civil society? To whom are NGOs responsible? To what extent are they posing realistic alternatives? To what extent do not you have intolerant, illiberal, fundamentalist, anti-feminist, all sorts of other groups as part of civil society?" So giving more space to civil society, yes in the domestic and international debate, but can we not hold them accountable to liberal international values as well because many of them are not, many of them are quite nasty and illiberal people, many of them are manipulated by states or even by Mafia groups and so on. We cannot just open the world up to civil society because a lot of nasty people are out there as well.

**Tony Giddens**

You want to hear some answers to these questions, this is not staged I assure you I didn't know what he was going to ask, but if you want to hear some answers to these questions come and hear the major thinker Ulrich Beck who comes to the LSE next term and always gives a couple of public lectures where he makes precisely these points. I do not write about civil society as Mary Kaldor and David Held do, but civil society produces what Ulrich Beck calls ugly citizens. Ugly citizens are people who take advantage of democratic rights and procedures, and the growth of civil society produces diversity of ugly citizens, for example, extreme right groups who use the Internet to promote their cause. So, there is no way you can say that civil society is a purely benign force.

The issue of democratic rights is a real one, I do agree with you on that. NGOs are no more elected than the big corporations are, therefore you couldn't substitute for orthodox democratic politics a world which was run too much by NGOs. One major reason for this is that NGOs represent different groups, some of them nasty, as we said, but NGOs are also special interest groups, somebody has to reconcile the different claims of these different interest groups and the only way of reconciling that is through democratic governments, therefore democratic government and citizenship within in democratic political systems must still remain the core of how you address those issues.

Shall we just have one or two quick questions from the audience.

**Question 1**

I am <NAME> a post graduate student from Birkbeck.

**Tony Giddens**

What are you doing here, then, what are you doing here if you are from Birkbeck? You shouldn't be at the LSE.

### **Question 1**

It is a globalising phenomena.

#### **Tony Giddens**

Well said.

### **Question 1**

I completely agree with you that the question is not whether we are being globalised or not, it is to identify the processes of globalisation and it is a very complex and complicated phenomenon but it seems to me that you are assuming a united experience of globalisation as you have said there are lots of agents within a globalisation process which experience globalisation in a different way and effect globalisation differently. Sure, I do not think that our experience of globalisation here in this lecture theatre is the same as a person who lives in Zambia turning on their radio.

#### **Tony Giddens**

Well, thanks. That's clear. It must be poor communication on my part because I tried to say that is indeed the case, so you must unpack the term globalisation. That's why it makes no sense to say you're for it or against it. Globalisation means a whole package of changes, many of them concentrated in the last 30 or so years affecting different people in different parts of the world very differently, sometimes accentuating the differences between them, for example sometimes accentuating differences between rich and poor, other times producing the opposite, because, we know for example that in East Asia, countries have got much richer than they were before, we know there is not a universal process of exclusion going on here. So it is quite right to say you are talking not of a single process but a highly differentiated one with different causal origins, different consequences affecting different people, differently in different parts of the world. But, there is the important sense in which no one is outside any longer. Your peasant in Zambia is inside the system much more than was ever true in the past, therefore, for example, what happens to the Argentinean economy, whether we like it or not, is going to effect all of us and the richer or the poorer countries.

No response from you please, can we have one more question.

### **Question 2**

Talking in Cardiff recently about the fundamentalist threat to our (globalised) world today, Tony Blair talked about people hating decadent society. How would you define a decadent society, do we have one and is that a bad thing if we are in one?

#### **Tony Giddens**

Well that is a pretty neat question. No I do not think we do have a decadent society, in the UK we have a pretty well established democratic system which has remained intact for a longer period than the democratic system of most western countries – some of which have been interrupted by periods of Fascism – and which permits tolerance, openness and the exchange of information of these kinds of issues openly. Those things are part of western values which are universalisable values: democracy, openness of debate, those universal things. But that is not the same as to say that our society is a society which answers questions of values and ethics satisfactorily because I would tend to say in some respects it does not. I wouldn't use the term decadent because it is such a culturally loaded term but there are ethical spaces in our society which need to be filled, some of those are in the political sphere and some are in the personal sphere. For example, when I come to talk about marriage and the family and sexuality, if you cannot sort of re-infuse the space of our lives with an ethics of relationships then there are serious moral problems in people's personal lives. But the answer surely is not a retreat to fundamentalism, the answer is surely not a belief system which is so rigid that it doesn't allow any open discussion, that is not the answer. So, you have to build on

democratic dialogue and this country and in quite a few countries in the world there has been an expansion of democracy, that is the universalisable value that is not decadent at all.

Well, thanks very much for coming everybody. I hope that you might come again next week.